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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 1990, the President signed into law the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA). The ADA is comprehensive legislation prohibiting discrimina-
tion against disabled persons in employment, public services, transportation,
places of public accommodation, and telecommunications. This article will at-
tempt to provide an overview of the ADA's major provisions concerning employ-
ment discrimination.
II. BACKGROUND
In passing the ADA, Congress found that the approximately forty-three million
disabled Americans' encountered discrimination in many forms "including out-
right intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transporta-
tion, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to
make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification
standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs,
activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities."2 Consequently, "people with
disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely
disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally."3 Con-
* Associate Professor, Temple University School of Law. B.A. New York University; J.D. Fordham Law School;
LL.M. Harvard Law School.
I acknowledge the support for this article provided by Temple University School of Law with special apprecia-
tion to Vivian Kessler and Vera McPhilomy.
Copied with permission of Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Pub. L. 101-336, § 2(a)(1), 104 Stat. 327, 328 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)).
2. Id. at § 2(a)(5), 104 Stat. 327, 328-29 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5)).
3. Id. at § 2(a)(6), 104 Stat. 327, 329 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6)).
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gress, finding that individuals with disabilities were "a discrete and insular minor-
ity,"" and invoking "the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce,"5 passed the ADA
in order
to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination
against individuals with disabilities and to bring persons with disabilities into the ec-
onomic and social mainstream of American life; to provide enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities, and to ensure that the
Federal government plays a central role in enforcing these standards on behalf of in-
dividuals with disabilities.
III. DISABILITY DEFINED
The ADA defines "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of . . . [an] individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an im-
pairment."7 This definition is comparable to that of "individual with handicaps"8
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,9 and is intended to have a
similar construction.' 0
The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources which ac-
companied the ADA makes plain that persons with contagious conditions, includ-
ing AIDS, come within the Act's provisions: "[A] person infected with the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus is covered under the first prong of the definition of the
term 'disability.' ""
Homosexuality, however, is not covered.12 Neither does the Act nor its corres-
ponding amendments to Section 504 protect individuals who use illegal drugs, un-
4. Id. at § 2(a)(7), 104 Stat. 327, 329 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)).
5. Id. at § 2(b)(4), 104 Stat. 327, 329 (codified at42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4)).
6. S. REP. No. 116, I01stCong., I stSess., pt. II, at 2 (1989); see also H.R. REP. No. 485, l01stCong., 2d
Sess., pt. II, at 22-23 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. III, at 27 (1990); H.R. REP. No.
485, 101st Cong.,-2d Sess., pt. IV, at 23 (1990).
7. Pub. L. 101-336, § 3(2), 104 Stat. 327, 329-330 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2)).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (Supp. 1988).
9. Id. at § 794.
10. S. REP. No. 116, at 21 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. IR, at 50 (1990); H.R. RF,. No. 485, pt.
III, at 27 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. IV, at 36 (1990).
11. S. REP. No. 116, at22 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. II, at51 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt.
III, at 28 (1990). Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 94 L. Ed. 2d 307 (1987), the Committee observed:
The third prong [of the definition of "disability"] includes an individual who has a physical or mental im-
pairment that substantially limits major activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such im-
pairment or has no physical or mental impairment but is treated by a covered entity as having such an
impairment .. . .This third prong is particularly important fbr individuals with stigmatic conditions that
are viewed as physical impairments but do not in fact result in a substantial limitation of a major life activity.
For example, severe burn victims often face discrimination.
S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. IV, at 24 (1989); see also H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. II, at 53 (1990); H.R. RPa. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. III, at 29-30 (1990).
12. Pub. L. 101-336, § 51 (a), 104 Stat. 327,376 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1221 l(a)).
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less they have been rehabilitated successfully."' Nevertheless, an individual,
otherwise disabled, is not excluded from coverage "if such individual also uses or
is also addicted to drugs." 4 As the Act's principal Senate sponsor observed:
[Tihe fact that a disabled person is a current user of illegal drugs does not mean
that the person is not protected under the Act when actions are taken against that in-
dividual, not on the basis of the current use of illegal drugs, but on the basis of the
disability. 1
IV. COVERED ENTITIES
Title I of the ADA, which becomes effective July 26, 1992,16 prohibits discrim-
ination in employment. The title covers employers "engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce" who, during the first two years following the effective date, have
twenty-five or more employees (and fifteen or more employees thereafter) "for
each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
year, and any agent of such person."17 Although not named expressly, "[state] gov-
ernments, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions" are nonetheless in-
tended to be included within the definition of "employer", if they would be
otherwise covered.18 Moreover, notwithstanding that Title I expressly excludes
the United States from coverage, 9 Section 509 revives that coverage as regards
Congress and its instrumentalities.2" Title I in addition applies to employment
agencies and labor organizations,21 as those terms are defined in Section 701 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.22
13. Id. at§510(a), 104 Stat. 327, 375 (codifiedat42 U.S.C. § 12210(a)-(b)); id. at§ 512(a), 104 Stat. 327,
376 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(i)-(v) (Supp. 1991)). See also id. at § 104(b), 104 Stat. 327, 335 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)). Specifically, the Act excludes from Section 504's coverage any individual who
currently uses illegal drugs. Id. at § 512(a). The ADA and its Section 504 amendments further provide that for
purposes of covered entities providing medical services, an individual who uses illegal drugs shall not be denied
the benefits of such services "on the basis of the current illegal use of drugs, if the individual is otherwise entitled
to such services." Id. at § 510(c), 104 Stat. 327, 376 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12210(c)); see also id. at §
512(a)(iii), 104 Stat. 327, 377 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(iii) (Supp. 1991)); id. at § 104(c), 104 Stat.
327, 335 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)).
14. Id. at § 512(a), 104 Stat. 327, 376-77 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(i)-(v) (Supp. 1991)); id. at §
104(a), 104 Stat. 327, 334 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a)).
15. 135 CONG. REc. S 11,224 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Harkin). Alcoholics, however, are
considered "disabled" for purposes of the ADA, S. REP. No. 116, at 22 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No. 485, pt.
II, at 142 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. III, at 76 (1990); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 558, 101 st Congress, 2d Sess.,
at 84-55 (1990), which leaves the coverage of alcoholics under Section 504 where it finds it. Pub. L. 101-336, §
512(a), 104 Stat. 327, 377 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(i)-(v) (Supp. 1991)).
16. Pub. L. 101-336, § 108, 104 Stat. 327,337 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111).
17. Id. at § 101(5)(a), 104 Stat. 327,330 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(a)).
18. S. REP. No. 116, at 24 (1989); see also H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. II, at 54 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt.
111, at 32 (1990).
19. Pub. L. 101-336, § 101(5)(b)(i), 104 Stat. 327, 330 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2)).
20. Id. at § 509, 104 Stat. 327, 373-75 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12209).
21. Id. at § 101(2), 104 Stat. 327, 330 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2)).
22.42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c) (employment agency); id. at § 2000e(d)-(e) (labor organization); Pub. L. 101-336,
§ 101(7), 104 Stat. 327, 331 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(7)). Title I also covers joint labor-management
committees. Id. at § 101(2), 104 Stat. 327,330 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2)).
1991]
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V. QUALIFIED PERSONS
The ADA protects only qualified disabled persons from employment discrimi-
nation. Individuals with disabilities are "qualified" if, "with or without reasonable
accommodation, [they] can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual[s] [hold] or [desire]."23 The term "reasonable accom-
modation" includes:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable
by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate
adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the pro-
vision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for in-
dividuals with disabilities.24
Title I prohibits a covered entity from denying "reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of [a] qualified individual . . . who is an
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accom-
modation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of. . . [its] busi-
ness,"2" by requiring "significant difficulty or expense."26 The Senate Committee
Report clarifies that "[i]n situations where there are two effective accommoda-
tions, the employer may choose the accommodation that is less expensive or eas-
ier for the employer to implement as long as the selected accommodation provides
meaningful equal employment opportunity,"27 defined as an opportunity "to attain
23. Pub. L. 101-336, § 101(8), 104 Stat. 327,331 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
24. Id. at§ 101(9), 104 Stat. 327, 331 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 121 l1(a)).
25. Id. at§ 102(b)(5)(A), 104 Stat. 327, 332 (codifiedat42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(a)). Title I alsoprohibits a
covered entity from "denying employment opportunities to ajob applicant or employee who is [a] . .. qualified
individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accom-
modation to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or applicant." Id. at § 102(b)(5)(B), 104 Stat.
327, 332 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B)).
26. Id. at § 101 (10)(A), 104 Stat. 327, 331 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (10)(A)). The Committee Report
described "undue hardship" by way of actions which were "unduly costly, extensive, substantial, disruptive, or
that will fundamentally alter the nature of the program." S. REP. No. 116, at 35 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No.
485, pt. II, at 67 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. III, at (1990); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 558, at 56(1990). Factors
to consider in determining undue hardship include:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this Act;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable ac-
commodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expense and resources, or the
impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity
with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and
functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship
of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
Pub. L. 101-336 § 101(b)(10)(B), 104 Stat. 327, 331 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (b)(l0)(B)).
27. S. REP. No. 116, at 35 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. II, at 66 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt.
III, at 40 (1990).
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the same level of performance as is available to non-disabled employees having
similar skills and abilities."28
Title I permits employers to require as a job qualification that applicants or em-
ployees with "currently contagious disease[s] or infection[s] . . . not pose a di-
rect threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace."29 The
Committee Report elaborates:
It is also acceptable to deny employment to an applicant or to fire an employee
with a disability on the basis that the individual poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of others or poses a direct threat to property. The determination that an indi-
vidual with a disability will pose a safety threat to others must be made on a case-by-
case basis and not be based on generalizations, misperceptions, ignorance,
irrational fears, patronizing attitudes, or pernicious mythologies.
The employer must identify the specific risk that the individual with a disability
would pose. The standard to be used in determining whether there is a direct threat
is whether the person poses a significant risk to the safety of others or to property,
not a speculative or remote risk, and that no reasonable accommodation is available
that can remove the risk.30
Title I further permits a covered entity to "hold an employee [who is a drug user
or alcoholic] to the same qualification standards for employment or job perform-
ance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any unsatisfac-
tory performance or behavior is related to . . . drug use or alcoholism."31
VI. FORBIDDEN DISCRIMINATION
Title I prohibits covered entities from discriminating against qualified individ-
uals "because of the disability of such individual[s] in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee com-
pensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment." 2 The prohibition in Section 504 against discrimination "solely" by reason
28. Id. The ADA follows regulations implementing § 504, 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 l(c) (1989), by forbidding em-
ployers from relying on the provisions of collective bargaining agreements to excuse their non-compliance. S.
REP. No. 116, at 32 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. II, at 63 (1990). Such provisions, however, can be
considered in determining the reasonableness of proposed accommodations: "For example, if a collective bar-
gaining agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with a given amount of seniority, it may be considered as a
factor in determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation to assign an employee with a disability without
seniority to that job." Id.
29. Pub. L. 101-336, § 103(b), 104 Stat. 327, 334 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b)).
30. S. REP. No. 116, at 27 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. II, at 76 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt.
III, at 45 (1990); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 558, at 58 (1990).
31. Pub. L. 101-336, § 104(c)(4), 104 Stat. 327, 335 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4)). Al-
though urging employers to provide rehabilitation programs or opportunities for rehabilitation to their addicted or
alcoholic employees, the Senate Committee Report, nonetheless, recognized that this was not an accommodation
required by the ADA. S. REP. No. 116, at 42. See also H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. IV, at 72 (1990); H.R. CONE.
REP. No. 485, at 60 (1990). This result, however, should not limit the accommodations required by § 504 since
the ADA was not meant to reduce the scope of coverage or "apply a lesser standard" under that statute. Pub. L.
101-336, § 501(a), 104 Stat. 327, 369 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a)).
32. Pub. L. 101-336, § 102(a), 104 Stat. 327,331-32 (1990).
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of a person's handicap33 was omitted from the ADA to ensure that the consider-
ation of non-disability factors would not immunize an employment decision which
otherwise took disability into account.34
Title I proceeds to define discrimination more specifically to forbid "limiting,
segregating, or classifying ...job applicant[s] or employee[s] in a way that ad-
versely affects . . . [their] opportunities or status ...because of . . .[their]
disabilit[ies]. " " This requires covered entities "to make employment decisions
based on facts applicable to individual applicants or employees, and not on the ba-
sis of presumptions as to what a class of individuals with disabilities can or cannot
do. 36
The ADA also incorporates a disproportionate impact standard. A covered en-
tity is forbidden from "participating in a contractual or other arrangement or rela-
tionship that has the effect of subjecting a . . .qualified applicant or employee
with a disabilty to . . .discrimination." 37 The Senate Report notes that "[t]his
standard is consistent with the interpretation of section 504 by the United States
Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate,"38 where the Court recognized that the
promise of non-discrimination for disabled people "would ring hollow if. . .le-
gislation could not rectify the harms resulting from action that discriminated by
effect as well as by design. 39
Moreover, the ADA prohibits the use of "employment tests or other selection
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a
class of individuals with disabilities unless the . . . test or other . . . criteria has
been shown [by the covered entity] to be job-related ...[and] consistent with
33. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides in pertinent part that "[n]o otherwise qualified
individual with handicaps ...shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of or subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal finan-
cial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1991) (emphasis added).
34. S. REP. No. 116, at 44 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. II, at 35 (1990).
35. Pub. L. 101-336, § 102(b)(1), 104 Stat. 327,332 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1)).
36. S. RaP. No. 116, at 28 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. II, at 58 (1990); H.R. RP. No. 485, pt.
M, at 36 (1990). Similar to § 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), the ADA forbids
retaliation against individuals because they "opposed any act or practice made unlawful by th[e] Act or because
[they] made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hear-
ing under th[e] Act." Pub. L. 101-336, § 503(a), 104 Stat. 327,370 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)).
Section 503(b) also prohibits the coercion or intimidation of persons for exercising rights afforded by the legisla-
tion. Id. at § 503(b), 104 Stat. 327, 370 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b)).
37. Pub. L. 101-336, § 102(b)(2), 104 Stat. 327, 332 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2)). Title I
further prohibits the use of "standards, criteria, or methods of administration (A) that have the effect of discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability; or (B) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common
administrative control." Id. at § 102(b)(3), 104 Stat. 327, 332 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)).
38. 469 U.S. 287, 105 S. Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985).
39. S. REP,. No. 116, at 30 (1989) (quoting Choate, 469 U.S. at 297). See also H.R. RE'. No. 485, pt. II, at
61 (1990). The Supreme Court in Choate, however, also "rejected 'the boundless notion that all disparate impact




business necessity,"" and "such performance cannot be accomplished by reason-
able accommodation.""' The Committee Report explains:
[Tihe requirement that job selection procedures be "job-related and consistent
with business necessity" underscores the need to examine all selection criteria to as-
sure that they not only provide an accurate measure of an applicant's actual ability to
perform the job, but that even if they do provide such a measure, a disabled applicant
is offered a "reasonable accommodation" to meet the criteria that relate to the essen-
tial functions of the job at issue.42
Title I permits covered entities to inquire into "the ability of . . . applicant[s] to
perform job-related functions. '" 4 1 "[T]o assure that misconceptions do not [enter]
the employment selection process,"" however, the Act forbids pre-offer medical
examinations and inquiries into whether applicants are disabled.' Post-offer med-
ical examinations are permitted "so long as they are given to all entering employ-
ees in a particular category, the results of the examinations are kept confidential,
and the results are not used to discriminate against individuals with disabilities un-
less such results make the individual not qualified for the job."46 As the Committee
Report observes: "[B]eing identified as disabled often carries both blatant and sub-
tle stigma. An employer's legitimate needs will be met by allowing . . . [post-of-
fer] medical inquiries and examinations which are job-related. 47
VII. ENFORCEMENT
Title I incorporates the remedies and procedures set forth in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, including recourse to the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission,' which is required to issue implementing regulations within
40. Pub. L. 101-336, § 102(b)(6), 104 Stat. 327, 332 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6)).
41. Id. at § 103(a), 104 Stat. 327, 333-34 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)). This burden of proof is meant
to parallel that imposed by regulations implementing section 504 which require that, "once it is shown that an
employment test substantially limits the opportunities of handicapped persons, the employer must show the test
to be job-related." 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. at 352 (1989). Those regulations further provide: "[An employer] is no
longer limited to using predictive validity studies as the method for demonstrating that a test or other selection
criterion is in fact job-related. Nor, in all cases, are predictive validity studies sufficient to demonstrate that a test
or criterion is job-related." Id.
42. S. REP. No. 116, at 38 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 1I, at 76 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt.
III, at 44 (1990).
43. Pub. L. 101-336, § 102(c)(2)(B), 104 Stat. 327, 333 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2)(B)).
44. S. Rep. No. 116, at 39 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. II, at 72 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt.
III, at 42 (1990); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 558, at 57 (1990).
45. Pub. L. 101-336, § 102(c)(2)(A), 104 Stat. 327, 333 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2)(A)).
With some restrictions, covered entities, pursuing affirmative action, may invite applicants for employment to
indicate whether they have a disability. S. REP. No. 116, at 40 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. II, at 75
(1990); H.R. RaP. No. 485, pt. III, at44 (1990).
46. Pub. L. 101-336, § 102(c)(3), 104 Stat. 327, 333 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(3)); see also
S. RaP. No. 116, at 39 (1989). See also H.R. RaP. No. 485, pt. II, at 3 (1990); H.R. REp. No. 465, pt. III, at 43
(1990); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 558, at 58 (1990).
47. S. REP. No. 116, at 40 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 11, at 75 (1990); H.R. RP. No. 485, pt.
III, at 44 (1990).
48. Pub. L. 101-336, § 107, 104 Stat. 327,336 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12117).
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one year of the ADA's enactment.49 Finally, Section 505 permits the award of at-
torney's fees in any action or administrative proceeding commenced under the
ADA to the prevailing party, other than the United States, which "shall be liable
for [attorney's fees] the same as a private individual."50
49. Id. at § 106, 104 Stat. 327, 336 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12116).
50. Id. at § 505, 104 Stat. 327,371 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12205).
